she adds salt then the stew will taste better, and in doing so we rationalise her action-show it to be rational. Two aspects of the cited belief and desire are important for the explanation and rationalisation of the behaviour: the content and their attitude-type. One must cite the content of her belief to explain why she added salt to the stew, rather than anything else. But, as Davidson points out, the two contents if she adds salt then the stew will taste better and the stew will taste better alone neither explain nor rationalise. But if we further specify the directions of fit that her mental states have, then both explanation and rationalisation are achieved. When we know that the state with content if she adds salt then the stew will taste better is worldguided, but the state with content the stew will taste better is world-guiding, then we know enough to explain and rationalise. These two directions of fit characterise the two attitudes which figure in the explanations of Humean psychology-beliefs and desires respectively. Explanations in terms of the attitude and content of beliefs and desires I'll call 'rational explanations'; these are the explanations of Humean psychology.
Smith himself has a suggestion as to why Humean psychology has excluded emotion, with its focus on belief and desire:
The most likely explanation for the exclusion of the emotions from accounts of rational psychology is that they are seen as mere distractions from rational agency: noise in the system, which at best serve as accompaniments to the real explanatory factors at work in agency and, at worse, interfere with the workings of reason guided action. (2002, 112) I want to take this thought as my point of departure in this paper, for Smith's answer contains an important point. The point is that in so far as the production and control of behaviour is rational, emotions are absent, and when emotions are present and playing a role, then the production and control of behaviour is less than fully rational. Emotions are here seen as mere hindrances to the proper workings of the rational mind-as 'sand in the system' one might say, changing Smith's metaphor a little. Recently the attitude towards emotion represented by the sand-in-the-system view has been challenged by theorists who have begun to claim that emotion, rather than being an unwelcome interruption to reason, is often essential to the proper working of reason (for example, Nussbaum 2001, Damasio 1994 and Mameli, this volume) . We might say that they are moving to view emotions as the oil in the system of reason. There is more to this debate than just whether emotions are a good or bad thing for reason. The issue is not just the evaluation of the outcome of the interaction of emotions with reasoning, but concerns the details of how the emotions interact with reason-how they serve (or interfere with) the rational processes which produce and guide behaviour. It is here that I propose we should look to find an answer to our question of why Humean psychology neglects emotion and trades only in belief and desire.
II
It is sometimes claimed (e.g. Frijda 1994 ) that moods differ from emotions in that whereas emotions have non-global effects on cognition, moods have only global effects on cognition. For example, one's good mood has the global effect on deliberation of leading one to overestimate the probable success of a course of action. There is one species of non-global effect in particular which emotions have which is important for our project, and is related to the other difference which is often cited between emotions and moods: the difference that emotions have intentional content, whereas moods lack intentional content. These are those non-global effects which emotions have in virtue of their having the intentional content they do.
To illustrate the intentional and non-intentional effects of emotion, let's take a sudden, eruptive emotion as an example. Suppose that, reading in bed, alone, a person is gripped with fear upon hearing a something go bump downstairs in the night. When gripped with fear, there are a variety of bodily changes which occur rapidly together, some on the surface, like a change in facial expression, others within. Among these changes are changes in circulation: an increase in the person's heart rate and diversion of blood away from her stomach to the muscles. This change will affect the performance of any number of strenuous behaviours (though it might be fighting and fleeing in particular which it is these changes' function to affect). Also in her terror there is a global change in her attention: she becomes sensitive to the slightest noises. This change too will have effects on behaviour, because the change in attention will alter quantity and nature of the incoming information which informs that behaviour. These two are relatively global effects of the fear on behaviour, and in characterising these effects, I did not need to mention any intentional property of the fear, such as that she is afraid of an intruder.
Emotions have intentional effects too. Returning to our woman, still terrified upstairs, the thought comes to her that there is an intruder downstairs. She cannot shake this thought, both in the sense of not being able to think about anything else, and in the sense that she is convinced it is true. It occupies her mind as an idée fixe, to use Peter Goldie's expression, and skews her epistemic landscape so that all the evidence points towards it (Goldie, this volume) .
2 The evidential force of considerations which support it are heightened, and the force of the evidence which would undermine her idée fixe is diminished. Minutes before becoming afraid (had she considered it) she would have found the following argument sound:
1
If there were an intruder downstairs the alarm would have gone off. 2
The alarm has not gone off. 3
Therefore there is no intruder downstairs. Now, in her fear, her epistemic landscape is skewed against 3 and the epistemic force of the argument is reversed so as to weigh against 1. Furthermore, her mind 'goes looking' (Goldie's phrase again) for reasons to doubt this premise: perhaps the man who sold her the system was a crook…, perhaps she forgot to switch the alarm on…, and so on. These effects of her fear are intentional effects; they depend on the intentional properties of the fear. It is not the evidential force of all her beliefs which is enhanced, only the force of some of them-such as her belief that the alarm salesman was crooked and her belief that the back door is easy to force open. And in specifying which beliefs are so enhanced by the fear, one must appeal to relations between the intentional content of those beliefs to the content of her fear. Examples such as these are familiar; in our everyday psychology we acknowledge that emotions play complex roles such as these in a person's mind (however well or badly folk psychology furnishes us with a theory which explains these roles). I do not need to argue here for the claim that emotions have effects such as these on our thought and behaviour, rather my point is that these effects are part of the data which Humean psychology must accommodate. The question is: how does a Humean psychology, using only belief and desire, accommodate the effects of emotion on behaviour?
Of the various effects of emotions, it is the intentional effects which present a challenge to one giving an answer to the above question. For if emotions are like beliefs and desires in having intentional effects on behaviour, then surely we need to cite emotions in our explanations of behaviour just as we cite beliefs and desires? And if not by citing emotions alongside beliefs and desires, then how else can a belief-desire psychology account for the intentional effects of emotions on behaviour? III I want to answer the question with which I ended the previous section by offering the following strategy to Humean psychology: Humean psychology can accommodate the complex, non-global causal roles of emotions by keeping its focus on belief and desire, and arguing that the way emotions have intentional effects on thought and behaviour is always via belief and desire. I will offer three versions of this strategy; of the three only the first has been explicitly taken up by defenders of Humean psychology, but only the second and third are viable.
Beliefs and desires themselves of course have intentional effects on thought and behaviour. My belief that the man in the coat is a spy does not affect all my other beliefs equally (though if epistemic holism is true, it may affect all my other beliefs). In spelling out the effects of this belief, one must specify (amongst other things) relations between the content of this belief and the contents of the states with which it causally interacts (such as my belief about whether he has a gun, and my desire to expose all spies as traitors).
The three strategies I will outline all explain the intentional effects that emotions have on the production and control of behaviour as parasitic on the effects that beliefs and desires have within the rational production and control of behaviour, hooking emotions to beliefs and desires in three different ways. The first strategy I will give is now (rightly) no longer popular, but it serves a useful role providing a contrast with which to define the other two.
The first strategy is to claim that emotions are made of beliefs and desires, perhaps together with other, non-intentional ingredients-call them 'feelings'. I call this the 'hybrid view of emotion' (following Paul Griffiths, 1997: ch2) ; Peter Goldie calls this view 'the add-on view of emotion ' (2000a, and this volume) . Philosophers who have endorsed the hybrid view of emotion were offering a reductive theory, analysing emotions (often from the armchair) into composites of a belief, a desire and a feeling (or multiples of these ingredients). So, for example, a hybrid theory might conclude that a certain kind of righteous anger is a composite of: a bad feeling of a certain sort, a negative evaluative belief that there has been an offence, a belief that someone is blameworthy, together with a desire to punish that someone (cf. Solomon 1977, 226-9) . Using the hybrid theory, one can account for both the intentional and the non-intentional effects of anger on thought and behaviour. One can account for the non-intentional effects by identifying them as effects either of the constituent non-intentional feeling, or of the non-intentional properties of a constituent propositional attitude, such as the strength of the desire (Marks, 1982) . And one can account for the intentional effects of the anger by identifying these effects as the constituent belief and desire playing their usual role in driving and guiding action.
The second and third options for Humean psychology are the heirs to the hybrid view of emotion, each in different ways. I call the second option 'the umbrella view'. The umbrella view differs from the hybrid view in this respect: it claims not that an emotion is a composite of a belief, a desire, and a feeling, but that one can treat an emotion as a belief, or as a desire in one's account of how the emotion figures as part of the production and control of behaviour. We can introduce umbrella terms 'belief-like' and 'desire-like' to capture the roles beliefs and desires respectively play in combining to produce and guide behaviour. In these terms we can state two claims which are important for the umbrella view-the first is the central claim of the umbrella view; the second is a claim which must be true if the umbrella view is to be a worthwhile strategy for integrating emotions into Humean psychology.
The central claim of the umbrella view is that beliefs are not the only belief-like states and desires are not the only desire-like states, and that, in particular, sometimes emotions are belief-like and sometimes emotions are desire-like. To claim that a state is belief-like is to say it has the kind of propositional content which beliefs have and it has the belief direction of fit, so the central claim is that emotions sometimes have propositional content and a world-guided direction of fit, and similarly for desire.
The claim which the umbrella view requires to be true in order to be a successful strategy is that not only are emotions sometimes belief-like and sometimes desire-like but that almost every time emotions are among the intentional causes of behaviour, they are so in virtue of being belief-like or being desire-like. The umbrella view does not need to capture those cases where emotions have non-intentional effects on behaviour; these can be relegated outside the proper scope of psychological explanation and explained physiologically. But it can only tolerate a few cases where emotions have intentional effects which are not in virtue of the emotion's being belief-like or desire-like. For it is the intentional effects of emotions for which we want to give a psychological explanation, so to the extent that the umbrella view fails to capture the intentional effects of emotion as belief-like or desire-like, Humean psychology fails to capture psychological explanation.
The third option for Humean psychology is again an heir to the hybrid view; I call this view 'the nomological view', for reasons soon to become clear. The hybrid view was that emotions are beliefs and desires; the umbrella view that emotions behave like beliefs and desires; the nomological view is that emotions carry beliefs and desires with them, as companions as it were. Recall the analysis of a particular kind of anger given above to illustrate the hybrid view-anger involves: a bad feeling, a negative evaluative belief that there has been an offence, a belief that someone is blameworthy, together with a desire to punish that someone. On the nomological view, the right way to read this claim is not as a constitutive claim about what anger is, but rather as a generalisation about anger-as the empirical claim that anger generally comes with these items. Recognising the empirical status of this claim is essential to understanding the nomological view.
The nomological view is committed to the truth of conditionals such as "if one is angry at X, then ceteris paribus, one believes that X is responsible for an offence" and it uses these conditionals to build explanations from emotion to behaviour. Furthermore it is committed to these conditionals being lawlike generalisations, otherwise these conditionals will not help build explanatory connections from emotions to behaviour. But note that these generalisations are not laws of Humean psychology, for to say that an person is angry at X is not to say that she has a reason to believe that X is responsible for an offence. Rather, generalisations of this kind lie outside the domain of rational explanation (I will have more to say about what kind of laws these are later). But Humean psychology can use these laws, as entry and exit rules, in and out of the domain within which its explanations operate.
In this way nomological view allows behaviour out of emotion to be accommodated into Humean psychology, while preserving the purity of Humean psychology as employing only belief-desire explanations. A person's behaviour out of emotion can be given an explanation which is both a belief-desire explanation and mentions the emotion as an intentional cause of the behaviour. But the explanation will have two parts. The first part lies outside the domain of rational explanation, and explains the person's beliefs and desires in terms of her emotional state. This serves as an entry rule for the second part, which is a rational explanation of her behaviour in the light of her beliefs and desires.
An analogy with perception is helpful here to illustrate entry and exit rules. Perceptual states give rise to beliefs: ceteris paribus, if I see that there is a banana on the desk, then seeing this causes me to believe that there is a banana on the desk. And this is a robust generalisation connecting perception to belief. Followers of McDowell (McDowell 1994; Brewer 1999) will place this connection within the scope of rational explanation, saying that my perceptual state gives me a reason to believe this.
3 Those who are not followers will disagree and will maintain instead that this generalisation is merely a law of some other kind. Their position with respect to the relation between perception and belief will be analogous to the nomological theorist's position with respect to the relation between emotion and belief and desire. Continuing this analogy, a non-McDowellean explanation of what I do when I eat the banana will have a two parts. There will be a rational explanation of my action in terms of my beliefs and desires, and (should anyone demand an explanation of why I have these beliefs and desires) there will be a different kind of explanation of my belief that there is a banana within reach-invoking my perceptual state together with the law that ceteris paribus, people believe what they see. In this way non-McDowelleans maintain the purity of the explanations of Humean psychology as belief-desire explanations, by committing themselves to another level of explanation where perceptual states are robustly connected to belief.
IV
The question with I began this paper asked why Humean psychology appeals only to an agent's beliefs and desires in its explanations when it is a commonsense truth that people sometimes act out of emotion. My answer has been that, despite the fact that we sometimes act out of emotion, Humean psychologists feel that they do not need to include emotion-terms into their explanatory vocabulary, because they have strategies for successfully explaining such actions in terms of belief and desire alone. In the hybrid view, the umbrella view and the nomological view, I have offered three such strategies. In this section I put the hybrid view to one side as a bad strategy; in the next section I bring the umbrella and nomological strategies under a single heading-'the non-reductive view'. The rest of the paper then begins to explore the merits and limits of non-reductive Humean explanation of emotional behaviour.
The hybrid view of emotion has been a well-occupied position in the philosophy of emotion (Kenny, 1963; Solomon, 1977; Marks, 1982; Taylor, 1984; Lyons, 1980; Oakley, 1992) , but it has (to my mind) been decisively criticised, the best of this criticism coming from Paul Griffiths (Griffiths, 1997: ch2; see also Goldie 2000a: ch2; Goldie and Spicer 2002) . One of Griffiths' criticisms targets the aprioristic methodology behind the hybrid view, pointing out that, with its basis in bad philosophy of language, the hybrid view was wrong in its attempt to deliver an account of the referents of emotion-terms from data consisting of folk-theory held by users of emotion-terms. So, with respect to the above example, to the extent that it strikes us as necessary that if one is angry at a person, one desires to punish that person, we should only conclude that it is implicit in our folk-conception of anger that when one is angry, one typically desires this. We cannot conclude that anger is a composite of this desire and some other ingredients. Even to the extent it is true that when one is angry, one typically desires this, the folk have only captured an empirical truth about this kind of anger, not a conceptual one.
The umbrella view is not subject to this criticism. To say that an emotion falls under the desire-umbrella as a desire to punish a person, is to make a claim about the role that this anger can play in the production and control of behaviour, not about what anger is. Furthermore, the umbrella view's claim about roles is consistent with the theory Griffiths offers about how the referents of emotion-terms are determined. Griffiths' view (which is also mine for the purposes of this paper) is that a particular emotion-type should be individuated as that natural kind (if there is one) underlying certain measurable features associated with the emotion-term. These observable features include distinctive facial expression, emotion-typical action, measurable autonomic and other bodily changes, and distinctive phenomenology (Griffiths 1997) . Similarly with the nomological view: the claim that an emotion is nomologically related to a desire is not a claim about what the emotion is, and is a claim consistent with Griffiths' view that the emotion is the kind underlying a certain syndrome of changes.
V
The umbrella and the nomological views seem close cousins, one claiming that emotions behave like beliefs and desires, the other that emotions causally co-occur with beliefs and desires. In fact, the two are species of a more general view which I shall call 'the non-reductive view'. We can state central claim of the non-reductive view by saying that emotions robustly cooccur with states which behave like beliefs and desires. Put this way, the nomological view is the non-reductive view plus the claim that the relation of robust co-occurrence a causal relation between distinct states. And the umbrella view is the non-reductive view plus the claim that the relation of robust co-occurrence is the identity relation.
The non-reductive view contrasts clearly with the (reductive) hybrid view. The heart of the non-reductive view is the claim that there is a body of true conditionals robustly connecting belief and desire to emotion, and that these conditionals have the status of empirical truths about the way emotions and cognitive states interact in minds like ours, rather than the status of a reduction of emotions to belief and desire. 4 The large literature which the hybrid view has generated over the years (see especially Solomon, 1997; Kenny, 1963; Marks, 1982; and Gordon, 1987 ) is full of generalisations connecting emotions to beliefs, desires and non-intentional states which, although they are in this literature offered as analyses of emotions, can be adopted by non-reductivists as empirical hypotheses. If these generalisations prove to be robust, then the non-reductive view is well placed to furnish Humean explanation with the beliefs and desires it needs to explain action out of emotion an emotional behaviour.
Are these explanations robust? In the case of generalisations connecting the basic emotions (such as anger, fear, and separation distress 5 ) to non-intentional (sometimes bodily) states, we have a science to hand to supply robustness. Neuroscience is giving the beginnings of accounts of how emotions give rise to and interact with autonomic nervous system changes, changes in facial and vocal expression and other bodily changes. Although I 4 So evidence that it is possible for emotions to occur in the absence of the relevant beliefs and desires will not threaten the non-reductive view, while this possibility is fatal to the hybrid view. Whether there is such evidence is another matter: Zajonc' work showing that there can be emotional appraisal without cognitive appraisal (meaning verbal report) only supports this possibility if reportability is necessary for possession of beliefs and desires (Zajonc 1980) . Arguments from the observation that infants and animals have the capacity to exhibit emotions while lacking the conceptual abilities to have the relevant beliefs and desires look stronger. 5 The question as to which are the basic emotions I leave aside, but see Ekman and Davidson 1994, ch1. suspect that neuroscience is not the place to hope to find generalisations connecting emotions with the intentional states belief and desire, let's assume, for the purposes of the rest of this paper, that there are robust generalisations connecting these states (in the next section I will give the name 'intentional psychology' to the theory which includes these generalisations).
The non-reductive view of emotion, armed with this body of generalisations, can set itself to defend the purity of Humean psychology as belief-desire explanation, while acknowledging that some of our behaviour is done out of emotion. The hope for the success of this project will be that for any emotional behaviour, it will fall into one of two categories. Either the behaviour can be assimilated to the bodily changes involved in emotional episodes such as change in facial expression or heart rate, or alternatively the behaviour can be explained in belief-desire terms. If this hope comes good then all of the behaviour out of emotion which is not mere bodily change will receive an explanation within Humean psychology; if the hope does not come good, then there will be behaviours for which we want to give a psychological explanation (for they are not mere bodily changes), but for which we cannot give a belief-desire explanation. The non-intentional effects of emotions on behaviour pose no threat to this hope; we are happy to think of them as bodily changes. It is the intentional effects of emotions which pose a threat. In the next section I will give some examples of intentional effects of emotions which look hard to explain in belief-desire terms.
VI
There is a spectrum of ways that emotions give rise to behaviour (see Goldie 2000b) . At one end there are those actions which are amenable to beliefdesire explanation, and we have been examining how a Humean psychology which trades in belief-desire explanations can accommodate such actions' sometimes being done out of emotion. At the other end of the spectrum are those behaviours which can be regarded as mere bodily changes, to be explained in physiological terms.
Peter Goldie finds the middle ground of this spectrum interesting, locating within this space a range of what he calls 'expressive behaviours' (Goldie 2000b) . Expressive behaviours themselves form a spectrum: toward the bodily-change end are behaviours more like changes in facial expression-behaviours which are more closely tied to the specific emotion, and which involve fewer other intentional states in their production. In the middle and toward the other end (closer to those behaviours that are clearly belief-desire explicable) are behaviours which are intentional effects of emotions, but which fit awkwardly into the belief-desire mould.
Goldie discusses an example of such a behaviour: of a person who, out of anger at a person, gouges at that eyes in that person's photograph (Goldie 2000b, 27) . This piece of (bad) behaviour-the gouging-fits badly into either category of being like a bodily change or being belief-desire explicable. It is too disanalogous to facial expressions to fit the first category: her gouging was something that this woman did, which she was in control of, and this control was mediated by other intentional states such as her perception of the photo and her beliefs about it. But her gouging is difficult to give a satisfactory belief-desire explanation either: if one tries to force it into the belief-desire mould, one has to posit unlikely beliefs and desires to yield an explanation (does she desire to injure anything that looks like her enemy, or does she believe that by gouging she is injuring her enemy?).
6
Other problematic cases of emotional behaviour occupying the middle ground are what Craig DeLancey calls 'postfunctional' behaviours (DeLancey 2002) . DeLancey argues that emotions are sometimes postfunctional in that they continue to drive behaviour after all the relevant desires are satisfied (and are believed to be satisfied). He gives an example of a person who is enraged at a dog which has attacked his child, and who takes his gun, goes out, and shoots the dog (DeLancey 2002, 53). As described so far, the person's shooting can be described in belief-desire terms. He wanted to kill the dog, and believed that shooting it would achieve this. And the shooting can be explanatorily connected to the man's anger by giving an entry rule showing how anger gives rise to desires of this sort. But the man's behaviour, as DeLancey goes on to describe it, is postfunctional: after the dog is dead (palpably dead-the man knows that the dog is dead) he continues to shoot more bullets into the carcass. He continues to fire out of his anger, but this is postfunctional behaviour and in driving this behaviour, the emotion is not playing the desire-role, DeLancey argues. The emotion is driving the behaviour in a way which cannot be explained by citing the any simple desire such as the desire to kill the dog, because any such desire, combined with the man's beliefs, would not drive behaviour the way the emotion does drive it (DeLancey 2002: ch3).
Both expressive behaviours and postfunctional behaviours challenge the adequacy of explaining emotional behaviour in terms of belief and desire alone. A third kind of case which poses a challenge are the effects of emotion on a person's epistemic landscape (as I described it earlier). For example, when a person is jealous, his jealousy skews his epistemic landscape. We can imagine a case in which two 'twins'-duplicates in all the relevant epistemic respects-who each come to suspect from a half overheard comment that their wife is being unfaithful. In one twin this suspicion arouses a gnawing jealousy; in the other twin the suspicion is untroubling. The untroubled twin considers the evidence-his wife's recent behaviour, her weekend business trips, and so on-and concludes that, all told, it points to his suspicion's being false. The jealous twin goes over the very same evidence in his mind, but his jealousy has skewed his epistemic landscape: he sees the evidence in a different light. For him, everything seems to point to his wife's unfaithfulness. In a case like this we naturally want to explain the difference in the way the two twins treat the evidence; in particular we want to explain how the jealous twin reasons by citing his jealousy. But, one kind of explanation-the most natural explanation-is ruled out if one is a Humean: that explanation which describes the twins as alike in what they believe and desire, but as reasoning differently because of their different emotional states. This explanation is ruled out because any Humean account of the difference in the twins' reasoning must go via citing a new belief or desire in the jealous twin which results from his jealousy; but any such new belief or desire would create the difference in beliefs and desires which, in describing the scenario, we have stipulated is absent.
The existence of these three problematic cases is not fatal to the nonreductive Humean view; they all depend on careful description to be problematic. In the last, epistemic case, the Humean can bite the bullet and deny the possibility of two twins who think alike but conclude differently. Likewise the Humean can explain expressive behaviours and postfunctional behaviours by biting the bullet and admitting that these agents have bizarre beliefs and desires (perhaps, in the gouging case, the woman desires to harm an image of her enemy and, in the shooting case, the man desires to harm the carcass of the dog).
There will be a certain clumsiness in the Humean strategy of positing bizarre beliefs or desires to give belief-desire explanations of expressive and postfunctional behaviours. The success of this strategy depends on how well the emotional behaviour (expressive or postfunctional) is explained as rational in the light of the agent's bizarre beliefs and desires. And the success of the strategy also depends on how well a second explanation can be given. This is the explanation of why, given the person's emotional state, the person has the bizarre beliefs and desires she does. The very bizarreness of the beliefs and desires to which the first explanation appeals increases the demand for the second explanation, and so increases the extent to which the overall success of the Humean strategy depends on the strength of the second explanation. And so the strength of a Humean explanation of a piece of expressive or postfunctional behaviour is partially dependent on the strength of the explanation of the agent's bizarre beliefs and desires.
VII
Some bizarre desires can be explained in terms of other bizarre desires. For example, let's suppose we explain the angry woman's gouging the photograph by appeal to her desire to gouge her enemy's photograph; now the demand is to explain why she desires this. If we give this explanation in belief-desire terms, citing her desire to harm something which resembles her enemy (together with her beliefs that the photo resembles her enemy and that gouging it will harm the photo), then the same question can be asked again: 'why does she desire this?'; we will have a chain of why-questions, and a chain of bizarre desires. The point is not only that the buck has to stop somewhere, but that it should stop with what is clearly an important factor in the woman's behaving as she does: her anger. After all, her anger is precisely what we would think of when commonsense psychologising: we might think 'well, she might well want to do that, given how angry she is'.
For the Humean, the umbrella view and the nomological view offer the two non-reductive ways to get anger into the picture. The umbrella theorist will say that at some point in specifying a chain of desires, one does mention the anger, for the anger realises the role of one of these desires. Unfortunately, the demand for explanations will not stop here for the umbrella theorist, since we can ask what it is about this anger which makes it desire-like in the right respect. This demand goes beyond the commonsense asking of 'why?' but rather this particular question about this token of anger is an instance of a more general demand for explanation which we can aim at the umbrella view. We can demand that the umbrella theorist explain how it can be that emotions can play the role of belief and desire in the production and control of behaviour. The answer to this will require a level of explanation which ascribes to emotions both intentional and nonintentional properties. At this level of explanation, the effects of a token emotion are explained by appeal to these properties, citing generalisations which connect possession of these properties to playing a certain causal role.
So the umbrella-Humean's account of the angry woman explains what she did by first explaining why the anger was desire-like (in terms of its having the intentional and non-intentional properties required to be desire-like in this way), and then rationally explaining what she did (in terms of her beliefs and desires).
A nomological theorist will answer the demand for an explanation of why this woman desires what she does in a similar way. The nomological theorist will say that there is an entry rule which describes a causal relation between emotion and desire. But, once again, in saying this the nomological theorist commits himself to a level of explanation distinct from rational explanation-a level of causal explanation at which the connections between emotions and beliefs and desires are explained. At this level of explanation, the effects of a token emotion are explained by appeal to their intentional and non-intentional properties, citing generalisations which connect the a state's having these properties to its causing the tokening of certain beliefs and desires. So the nomological-Humean's account of the angry woman explains what she did by first explaining why the anger caused her desire (in terms of the anger's having the intentional and non-intentional properties which typically cause that desire), and then rationally explaining what she did (in terms of her beliefs and desires).
So, whichever form it takes, the non-reductive view needs to appeal to explanations outside the scope of Humean psychology to explain why emotional agents have the beliefs and desires they do. We can call this level of explanation 'intentional psychology'. I already have mentioned intentional psychology as that theory which contains the robust generalisations connecting emotions to beliefs and desires which the nonreductive Humean view requires. So the present point is that this body of robust generalisations is needed to do explanatory work-precisely the work Humean psychology alone cannot do in these difficult cases.
As I have introduced it here, the term 'intentional psychology' is just a place-holder for that theory which contains robust generalisations connecting emotions and perceptual states to beliefs and desires; the term is meant to be neutral on the details which would positively characterise this theory. However, I have committed myself to this much in positive characterisation of intentional psychology: intentional psychology posits a set of properties, which intentional states such as emotions, beliefs and desires possess, and in terms of which the causal relations between these states are explained (Fodor, 1987) . Because the causal relations to be explained at the level of intentional psychology include the intentional effects of emotions on beliefs and desires (which, like the effects of perceptual states on beliefs, are specified in terms of their content) the causally relevant properties include intentional properties. Hence the label 'intentional psychology'.
Various research programs fall under the label of intentional psychology as I use it here, varying in their views as to what intentional properties are. But there could be an intentional psychology which, if explanatorily powerful enough, could legitimately remain neutral on what intentional properties are and leave them as primitives within the theory (Segal 2000) .
Intentional psychology gives causal, intentional explanations of cognitive processes. The variety of these processes and explanations is not restricted to the belief-desire interactions treated by Humean psychology; it is in this respect that intentional psychology and Humean psychology differ. The kind of Humean psychology I am discussing in this paper might want distance itself from intentional psychology, in particular refusing to admit that Humean psychology reduces to intentional psychology ). But we have seen in this section is that it is to intentional psychology that Humean psychology must turn if it is to explain (by the non-reductive route) how emotions give rise to beliefs and desires, and hence is to explain emotional behaviour.
VIII
In this last section I want to ask whether the price which Humean psychology must pay to preserve belief-desire explanation is worth paying. Or rather I want to suggest that, if one has the currency to pay this price, belief-desire explanation might not be the way to spend it. The currency is intentional psychology; with this currency Humean psychology can buy rational explanations of emotional behaviour. But if one has the causalexplanatory framework of intentional psychology already, could one not use this framework directly to explain actions out of emotion? One would then have a single, unified explanatory framework for the explanation of (emotional and unemotional) behaviour. This is a guiding ambition of the cognitive science research program. Of course, there is not space here to evaluate this program's prospects of success; rather, my aim in this paper has been to show that the ambition of keeping emotional behaviour within the scope of Humean psychology brings with it a commitment to a level of causal explanation powerful enough to explain the intentional effects of emotions on belief and desire. But then the present thought is that this level of explanation alone may be powerful enough to explain emotional behaviour directly. Having a uniform level of explanation is a methodological virtue, so if Humean psychology needs intentional psychology, but not vice-versa, this is a point against Humean psychology. We should prefer the uniform to the mixed-level explanation, so perhaps we should do away with and do without Humean psychology? Doing without Humean psychology might mean either discarding belief-desire explanation, or subsuming it-by thinking of belief-desire interactions as just one kind of causal-intentional process, and thinking of belief-desire explanation as just kind of causal-intentional explanation. The former is eliminativism about belief and desire, and nothing in this paper supports this eliminativism. The little I have said positively about intentional psychology is perfectly compatible with intentional psychology's including beliefs and desires in its ontology, so adopting intentional psychology as a unified framework for explaining emotional and unemotional behaviour is compatible with some of these explanations' being belief-desire explanations. The second option of sanitisation is supported by the considerations of this paper.
Subsumption has the virtue of allowing the possibility of choice: sometimes the effects of emotions on behaviour might go via beliefs and desires, and sometimes they might not. In some cases the best explanation of a piece of expressive behaviour might be a belief-and desire-invoking explanation; for example one might explain the woman's gouging the photograph in terms of her desiring to harm an image of her enemy, just as the Humean did. But, after subsumption, this belief-desire explanation would be a fragment of a larger explanation which also explains her desire in terms of her anger. In other cases the best explanation of a piece of expressive behaviour might not mention beliefs and desires, but might merely appeal to the intentional properties of other mental states: perceptual states and emotions, say. For a particular piece of emotional behaviour, how will we decide whether beliefs and desires are involved? This seems an empirical issue (LeDoux's work on the multiple pathways of informational processing in fear looks like the kind of empirical work which might allow us to settle this behaviour by behaviour-LeDoux, 1994), and it is a virtue of subsuming beliefs and desires into intentional psychology that we are left free to decide it empirically, rather than have it decided by our commitment to an explanatory framework.
Reflection on the clumsiness of Humean explanations of postfunctional and expressive behaviours, and of emotionally skewed inferences, leads me to conjecture that once freed in this way, we might find that our best intentional explanations invoke fewer beliefs and desires than present Humean explanations do. Humean explanations might sometimes capture the real causal pattern by which action arises out of emotion, but there is a (perhaps large) body of 'middle' cases of emotional behaviour where the structure of the causes is not captured by the Humean pattern. Such cases neither are cases of bodily change resulting from emotion, nor are they cases of behaviour explicable in terms of beliefs and desires which in turn are explicable as resulting from emotion. The scope of belief-desire explanation, I suggest, is smaller than as Humeans we presently recognise.
